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ABSTRACT
A LIBERAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS TO PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION LAWS
by
Michael Doering

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016
Under the Supervision of Professor Stanislaus Husi

In 2015, the United States Supreme Court effectively made same-sex marriage legal
throughout the country. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy opined that not extending
marriage equality to same-sex couples violated both their autonomy and their right to equal
dignity under the law. Three years earlier, a same-sex couple visited Masterpiece Cakeshop, a
bakery in Colorado, and requested that the owner design and create a cake to celebrate their
same-sex wedding. The owner declined, advising the couple that he did not provide wedding
cakes for same-sex weddings due to his religious beliefs. He was found guilty of violating the
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In this
paper, I present a liberal argument for the proposition that narrowly-tailored exemptions ought
to be provided to wedding vendors such as Phillips with religious objections to same-sex
marriage. In arguing for this claim, I provide a compromise between those who believe that the
relevant anti-discrimination provisions should be categorically applied to all businesses open to
the public and proponents of religious liberty who maintain that any business with religious
objections to same-sex marriage should be able to refuse service to same-sex couples.
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In Obergefell v. Hodges, the United States Supreme Court effectively made same-sex
marriage legal throughout the country.1 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy opined that
not extending marriage equality to same-sex couples violated both their autonomy and their
right to equal dignity under the law.2 Even as he argued that the Constitution extends the right
to marry to same-sex couples, he also insisted that there are many citizens of the United States
who reach the conclusion that same-sex marriage is wrong “based on decent and honorable
religious or philosophical premises” and that such people are reasonable, sincere and hold this
belief in good faith.3 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Roberts argued that the Court intervening
in the political process on the issue of same-sex marriage would close the minds of those who
disagreed with the institution and would have potentially negative consequences for how it
would be accepted by the broader society.4
It seems, in part, that Justice Robert’s prediction has come true. Although the Court’s
decision made it perfectly legal for same-sex couples to get married in all fifty states, a lack of
consistent anti-discrimination protections put such couples in a precarious position. For
example, a year after the Obergefell ruling, Russell Roybal, deputy executive director of the
National LGBTQ Task Force, stated that “in a lot of places, [same-sex couples] can go to [their]
county clerk and get a marriage license and get married and then get fired the next week
because now [they] are openly gay.”5 The suggestion made by Roybal is that, while achieving

1

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
Ibid., 2593-2608.
3
Ibid., 2594-2602.
4
Ibid., 2611-2633 (Justice Roberts dissenting).
5
Liam Stack, “The Challenges That Remain for L.G.B.T. People After Marriage Ruling,” The New York Times, June 30,
2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/us/the-challenges-that-remain-for-lgbt-people-after-marriageruling.html.
2

1

marriage equality may have been a net positive for the gay community, the Court’s ruling on
this matter has not been without substantial social costs.
While the LGBTQ community and its allies strive for adequate anti-discrimination
provisions, in the states and municipalities where those regulations are in place, business
owners with religious beliefs about the sinful nature of same-sex marriage have been adversely
affected as a result of them. In 2014, Christian farm owners in New York were fined $10,000 for
declining to host a same-sex wedding ceremony on their property.6 A year before that, the
Supreme Court of New Mexico found that a business, Elane Photography, violated the New
Mexico Human Rights Act by refusing to photograph a commitment ceremony between two
women.7 In June of 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States accepted a similar case which
involves this tension between anti-discrimination laws and the religious convictions of certain
business owners in the wedding industry. The case involves Jack Phillips, an owner of a bakery
who lost a case in the Colorado Court of Appeals for refusing to sell a wedding cake to a gay
couple.8 In effect, Phillips is requesting that he be exempted from the Colorado AntiDiscrimination Act on account of his religious beliefs.
In this paper, I present a liberal argument for the proposition that narrowly-tailored
exemptions ought to be provided to wedding vendors with religious objections to same-sex
marriage. In arguing for this claim, I reconcile the Court’s statement that reasonable citizens
can disagree with the institution of same-sex marriage with the government’s stated interests

6

Sarah Pulliam Bailey, “Farm owners fined for saying no to lesbian wedding,” The Washington Post, August 19,
2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/religion/farm-owners-fined-for-saying-no-to-lesbianwedding/2014/08/19/1cfe5ca2-27dd-11e4-8b10-7db129976abb_story.html.
7
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 56 (2013).
8
Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d 272 (2015). This case is being heard by the Supreme Court as
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission.
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in preventing invidious discrimination. Furthermore, I hope to provide a compromise between
those who believe that the relevant anti-discrimination provisions should be categorically
applied to all businesses open to the public and proponents of religious liberty who maintain
that any business with religious objections to same-sex marriage should be able to refuse
service to same-sex couples. I maintain that there are situations in which business owners in
the wedding industry are substantially burdened by public accommodation laws and that
providing narrowly-tailored exemptions does not undermine the government’s compelling
interests in applying such laws. At the same time, I believe that the burdens experienced by
business owners should be balanced against the harms experienced by same-sex couples who
are refused service in the public marketplace.
By limiting my discussion in this way, I am avoiding many other contentious issues such
as whether tax-exempt religious organizations should be compelled to facilitate same-sex
marriages or whether government officials should be exempted from regulations requiring
them to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.9 While some of the arguments I put
forward could be extended to these cases, I do not intend the reasoning I employ to be
analogous nor would I expect to arrive at the same conclusion were I to address those
scenarios. The narrow question I will address in this paper is whether there are scenarios in
which wedding vendors should be exempt from public accommodation laws and, if so, what
conditions ought to be met for the exemptions to be granted.
In section one I frame the debate as a conflict between two fundamental liberal values
and argue that a balancing approach should be used to mediate the seeming conflict. I also
9

For discussion of these issues, see Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello Jr., and Robin Fretwell Wilson, eds.,
Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty: Emerging Conflicts (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2008).
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explicitly note what the objects of the religious exemptions at issue are (that is, the specific
laws which certain businesses ought to be exempt from). In section two, I present a liberal
framework developed by Kevin Vallier for deciding when religious exemptions to legitimately
enacted laws are warranted. I apply this framework to the facts of Masterpiece Cakeshop v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission and argue that the petitioner in that case warrants an
exemption under the conditions which Vallier set out. In section three, I discuss how the
exemptions I defend would be narrowly-tailored and why they would not undermine the
government’s compelling interests underlying anti-discrimination regulations. I conclude in
section four by considering some objections to my view.

§1. Religious Liberty and Equality: A Case of Conflicting Values
One way to frame the dispute between religious business owners in the wedding
industry and same-sex couples is as a conflict between two fundamental liberal values: equality
and liberty. Equality is enshrined as a political value in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While the Fourteenth
Amendment extends to all citizens “equal protection of the laws,”10 Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was enacted to prevent unjust discrimination in places of public accommodation
and to ensure equal access to goods and services. It states:
All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.11

10

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a (1964). In 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act supplemented
the language of the federal law by including disability as a protected class. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. § 12182 (1990).
11
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While the federal public accommodation law does not include sexual orientation as a protected
characteristic, twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have explicit prohibitions against
sexual orientation discrimination in the realm of public accommodations.12 The definitions of
public accommodation utilized in state statutes are also typically broader than the definition
utilized in the federal law.13 For instance, Colorado’s public accommodation law defines a
“place of public accommodation” as “any place of business engaged in any sales to the public
and any place offering services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to the
public.”14 I take Colorado’s law to be a model public accommodation law for my purposes. That
is, the laws I have in mind when discussing exemptions are those laws which prohibit
businesses open to the public from discriminating on the basis of an enumerated list of
specified characteristics – sexual orientation being among them. The businesses I have in mind
are those which provide goods or services for weddings or comparable events (such as
commitment ceremonies).
Wedding vendors who have been accused of violating public accommodation laws
invariably cite concerns that their liberty is being undermined by said laws. Specifically, when
these cases go to court, the vendors generally argue that the application of public

12

Issac Saidel-Goley, “The Right Side of History: Prohibiting Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Public
Accommodations, Housing, and Employment,” Wisconsin Journal of Law, Gender & Society 31 (2016): 121.
13
The federal statute limits places of public accommodation to “lodgings, facilities principally engaged in selling
food for consumption on the premises; gasoline stations; places of exhibition or entertainment” or any
establishment “(i) which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this
subsection, or (ii) within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment.” See Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a (1964).
14
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, C.R.S.A. § 24-34-601 (2014). A limit placed on this definition is such that places
of public accommodation would not include “a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used
for religious purposes.”
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accommodation laws violate their First Amendment rights.15 The First Amendment to the
United States Constitution states, in part, that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech. . .”16 Phillips, the owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop has cited both the Free Exercise
Clause and the Free Speech Clause in arguments before the Colorado Court of Appeals and the
United States Supreme Court. Phillips argued that application of Colorado’s public
accommodation law compels him to choose between violating his religious commitments and
violating the law. In addition, he argued that the conduct of creating a wedding cake is
inherently expressive and that any law which compels him to create wedding cakes for
particular weddings thereby compels him to express a message of approval for those
weddings.17 Therefore, the law as applied is a burden on his freedom of expression and
religious exercise. If this is true, then his business and others like it deserve an exemption from
public accommodation laws – or so the argument goes.
Opponents of exemptions, on the other hand, argue that the purpose underlying public
accommodation laws is not to violate the constitutional rights of business owners and that the
laws effectively do not do so. Rather, their purpose and effect is to guarantee that individuals
with particular characteristics are not unjustly discriminated against in the public marketplace.
Such discrimination can have tangible material costs such as limiting access to important goods

15

Careful legal arguments would actually implicate both the First and Fourteenth Amendments as the rights listed
in the First Amendment have only been made applicable against state governments through the Due Process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) and Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
16
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17
Craig, 370 P.3d at 272.
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and services. It can also cause serious, though arguably immeasurable, harm on the dignity of
those discriminated against.
The aforementioned positions illustrate that there is a prima facie conflict between the
value of equality appealed to by proponents of broad application of anti-discrimination
provisions and the value of liberty appealed to by their opponents. This conflict can be phrased
in simple terms. In order to maintain the equal treatment of minorities in the public
marketplace, there need to be limits placed on the liberty of businesses open to the public and
their owners. For the purposes of this paper, I concede that this is true with respect to certain
immutable characteristics such as sexual orientation. For instance, no business should be
allowed to refuse to serve an individual solely based on their sexual orientation. The crux of the
debate then, as I see it, is not whether anti-discrimination laws justifiably place limits on the
liberty of citizens but what the boundaries of those limits should be.
There are two diametrically opposed positions that one could take regarding this issue.
The first, what might be called the ‘equality approach,’ is that the equality of same-sex couples
should trump any liberty interests which vendors may have.18 In effect, this position maintains
that the rights to religious exercise and freedom of expression should never include the right to
discriminate in the public marketplace on the basis of protected characteristics. The second
position may be called the ‘religious liberty approach.’19 This position maintains that when
there is a bona fide religious objection to same-sex marriage present, the business in question
should be allowed to refuse service to same-sex couples. In this paper, I take myself to be

18

Steven J. Heyman, “A Struggle for Recognition: The Controversy over Religious Liberty, Civil Rights, and Same-Sex
Marriage,” First Amendment Law Review 14 (2015): 48-52.
19
Ibid., 52-53.
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offering a compromise between these two positions which values both the equal treatment of
all parties and the liberty interests at stake. Before I turn to my positive argument, I will offer
brief arguments for why the ‘equality approach’ and the ‘religious liberty approach’ should be
abandoned in favor of an approach that balances the underlying values at play.
1.1. The Equality Approach
As stated earlier, equality as a political value is invoked in both the federal public
accommodation law and the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Those who
defend the equality approach maintain that the value of equal treatment should trump any
appeals to religious liberty. My argument against the equality approach is twofold. First, I
maintain that any sufficiently robust right to religious exercise will include the right to
discriminate in a way that many might see as invidious or unjust. Second, even if this right does
not adequately motivate granting exemptions in the public accommodation context, equality
interests can be invoked on both sides of the disputes. Thus, any approach which categorically
treats the value of equality as superior to religious liberty risks either inconsistent or unfair
application.
My first claim is that any sufficient right to exercise religion will include some right to
discriminate, perhaps invidiously. One paradigmatic example of this is the so-called ‘ministerial
exemption.’ In 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided a case regarding a teacher who
filed suit for unlawful dismissal under the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act against her
former employer, an Evangelical Lutheran Church and School in Michigan. The Court
unanimously held that federal anti-discrimination laws do not apply to the employment of

8

ministers or religious leaders by religious organizations.20 There is ample room for debate
regarding what positions should count as ‘ministerial’ and which organizations should count as
‘religious.’ But there is almost no disagreement amongst those who value religious liberty that
religious organizations should be able to discriminate against some classes of individuals in
choosing who to hire as ministers. This ability to discriminate is essential to the autonomy of
religious organizations. For instance, take a Christian church. Nearly everybody agrees that such
a church should be able to discriminate against non-Christians in hiring their minister(s).
Perhaps more controversially, many churches believe that women should not, or cannot due to
theological fiat, serve in certain positions of religious authority. Thus, many churches
discriminate against women when they hire ministers. Both types of discrimination –
discrimination against women and non-Christians – would be in plain violation of federal antidiscrimination law if courts and legislators did not recognize an exemption for religious
organizations. As stated earlier, there is room for debate regarding the specific details but any
sufficient right to religious exercise will include some right to discriminate – the most
uncontroversial case being religious organizations having the right to discriminate against nonmembers of the religion in hiring for positions of religious authority.
A likely response to this point is that it is irrelevant for the current discussion.
Opponents of exemptions to public accommodation laws could easily concede that the
ministerial exemption represents a unique and narrow set of cases where exemptions are
appropriate and that it does not establish that exemptions would be appropriate in the public
accommodation context. This is true and I only point to the ministerial exemption to rebut the
20

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 565 U.S.
171 (2012).

9

proposition that religious liberty never includes the right to discriminate. If the ministerial
exemption is appropriate, then there are at least some cases where exempting parties from
anti-discrimination laws is appropriate and the value of equality should not universally override
religious liberty concerns. I now turn to my second claim, aimed primarily at those who may not
believe that the ministerial exemption is appropriate or those who do not think it gives us any
reason to believe that exemptions would be appropriate in the public accommodation context.
My second claim is this: both sides of legal disputes concerning the application of public
accommodation laws in the wedding industry can appeal to the value of equality in defending
their positions. Let us look first at the same-sex couples who have brought law suits against
wedding vendors who refused to serve them. Their argument is that by refusing service,
vendors have treated them unequally. Let us grant for the moment that this is true. In other
words, I am willing to concede that vendors do treat same-sex couples unequally by refusing
service to them.21 Furthermore, they are treating them unequally on the basis of a
characteristic explicitly protected by anti-discrimination provisions – sexual orientation. Such
unequal treatment is precisely why anti-discrimination regulations were instituted so granting
exemptions to them, either legislatively or through judicial review, would seem to undermine
their very purpose.
While one of the purposes of public accommodation laws is to prevent unequal
treatment by businesses in the public marketplace, application of them often leads to unequal
21

Although I am willing to concede this point, it is not obvious that it is true. For example, wedding vendors who
refuse service to same-sex couples may make the argument that they would refuse service to any customer if they
thought that serving said customer would facilitate a religious ceremony they found disagreeable or offensive. In
these cases, vendors often argue that they are not refusing service on the basis of sexual orientation but rather
because they find the conduct of a same-sex wedding immoral and do not wish to be associated with it. Courts
have typically rejected this distinction between conduct and identity characteristics as the conduct of a same-sex
wedding is so closely associated with identifying as a homosexual.
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treatment by state or federal governments. For instance, take the case of Elaine Huguenin, the
owner of Elane Photography. When asked to photograph a commitment ceremony between
two women, Huguenin refused citing her religious beliefs. Her refusal was found to be in
violation of the New Mexico Human Rights Act. There is one sense in which application of the
New Mexico law is perfectly equal. Every business in New Mexico which opens itself up to the
general public is subject to this law and cannot refuse customers on the basis of sexual
orientation. But not all business owners believe that providing their goods and services to
same-sex couples implicates their moral or religious commitments in any significant way. For
those that do, laws such as the New Mexico Human Rights Act compel them to choose between
living their professional lives in accordance with their religious commitments, obeying the law
or possibly giving up their financial and personal stability by shutting down their business.22
Because of this, New Mexico’s public accommodation law and others like it enforce an unequal
distribution of burdens and benefits. Religious business owners who believe that operating
their business in line with their religious commitments entails refusing service to same-sex
couples are burdened by public accommodation laws by having to compromise their religious
identity or their financial/personal stability. Business owners who do not share these beliefs are
not burdened in the same way.
Thus, the ‘equality approach’ entails one of two commitments. The first is that courts
and legislators should attempt to guarantee the equal treatment of the same-sex couples in the

22

In some jurisdictions, the choice of ‘shutting down’ their business may be too starkly worded. For example, if
Elane Photography ceased to operate a publicly accessible website and relied on word of mouth rather than public
marketing for business, it could be that courts would not deem her a public accommodation. In that case, the issue
of whether she discriminated against would-be customers or whether such discrimination is protected by
constitutional amendments or statutes would not even arise. Taking such actions, however, may still risk the
financial stability of the business if the website or public marketing was a large producer of business transactions.
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public marketplace which would also guarantee the unequal treatment of religious business
owners by the government. This would require an account of why we should elevate the equal
treatment of one group over that of another. Alternatively, courts and legislators could attempt
to draw some sort of line to adjudicate when they favor the equality of one group over another.
In this case, equality is not acting as a ‘trump’ but is operating as one value among many. But
this is inconsistent with the equality approach.
1.2. The Religious Liberty Approach
To reiterate, the religious liberty approach maintains that whenever a wedding vendor
has a sincere religious objection to same-sex marriage, they ought to be granted an exemption
to relevant public accommodation laws. Similar to the equality approach, I object to this
approach on two fronts. First, just as there are equality interests on both sides, there are also
liberty interests on both sides. Second, even if there is a compelling reason why we should treat
‘religious’ liberty more importantly than the liberty of same-sex couples in the public
marketplace, giving categorical deference to appeals to religious liberty would drastically
undermine the purposes of anti-discrimination law.
It is fairly uncontroversial that anti-discrimination laws enforce limits on liberty. If
businesses wish to discriminate, then such laws impede their ability to do so. Thus, in the public
accommodation context, anti-discrimination laws are a limit on the negative liberty on
otherwise discriminatory businesses. Negative liberty is often defined as freedom from
interference, where such interference can take the form of external obstacles, barriers or
constraints. In this case, the constraint on the liberty of business owners takes the form of antidiscrimination laws backed by government coercion and authority. The fact that these laws do

12

infringe on the negative liberty of certain persons should be relatively uncontroversial and does
not automatically entail any particular evaluative judgment about the law.23
However, as philosophers working on liberty and freedom have long noted, negative
liberty is not the only type of freedom worth caring about. There is also what has often been
called positive liberty or, alternatively, autonomy. I save my full discussion on how the
autonomy of same-sex couples can be affected by invidious discrimination for a later section
but I will briefly note here how I intend to cash out this claim. Not only does discrimination by
businesses affect the autonomy of same-sex couples by limiting their range of options in the
public marketplace, it also affects their capacity to be fully autonomous agents by undermining
their sense of self-worth and self-respect. Thus, defenders of the religious liberty approach are
not categorical defenders of liberty per se but liberty of a particular kind, namely, religious
liberty. Just as was the case with the equality approach, this particular commitment would
require an account of why we ought to treat religious liberty as more important than the liberty
of same-sex couples.
Let us assume for the moment that there is such an account – that is, there are
compelling reasons for why we ought to treat religious liberty as having a special status. Even if
this is true, I maintain that categorical deference to those vendors who have religious
objections to same-sex marriage would drastically undermine the purposes of antidiscrimination law. Even if the exemptions were limited to the wedding industry (which could
likely be accomplished through statutory provisions – be they federal or state), these

23

In fact, I assume throughout this paper that some infringements on the liberty of otherwise discriminatory
business owners are justified. I do not believe, however, that categorical application of the law is justified as I
believe that exemptions ought to be granted in certain instances.
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exemptions would extend to a whole host of businesses: bakers, florists, tailors, restaurants,
banquet halls, photographers, hotels, etc. It is also not clear what principled distinction could
be made to justify granting exemptions to businesses with religious objections to same-sex
marriage but not those businesses with religious objections to interracial marriages or
interreligious marriages. Again, this distinction could just be created within the language of a
statute but the affordance of even these legislatively crafted exemptions to businesses which
have religious objections to same-sex marriage would mean that the potential for same-sex
couples to be excluded from an entire part of the public marketplace would be present (even if
unlikely). The mere fact that the potential is real, however, and made possible through
government efforts should give pause to any liberal who endorses the anti-discrimination
principle underlying the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection clause.24
These are just a few reasons why we should abandon the equality approach and the
religious liberty approach in favor of an approach which balances the opposing interests of the
parties. No doubt some readers have found them ultimately unconvincing or can think of
objections or arguments which I have not considered. This is inevitable as my primary intent in
this paper is not to prove that these approaches are wrong (though I believe that they are) but
is rather to present a positive argument for granting exemptions. I turn to this argument in the
following sections.

§2. A Liberal Account of Religious Exemptions
In the following two sections, I offer a positive liberal argument for granting religious
exemptions to public accommodation laws. I call it a ‘liberal’ argument because liberals are
24

It should be stated that this argument is stated on strictly liberal grounds. Whatever kind of liberalism one
espouses, I assume that it holds some pride of place to the value of equality.
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conventionally committed to the values of liberty and equality. Furthermore, a general task of a
liberal political philosophy is to conceive of principles or policies which will help citizens live in a
society which is pluralistic in nature. In other words, there is deep disagreement amongst
citizens regarding matters of morality, religion and philosophy and one task of liberalism is to
try and discover a way for citizens to live together in such a pluralistic society with as little
conflict as possible.
A core commitment of liberal political theory is a presumption of liberty. That is, liberals
generally assume that citizens should be free to conduct their lives in the way they see fit and
any government intervention into that freedom requires justification. Kevin Vallier has recently
developed a framework for when religious exemptions to legitimately enacted laws are publicly
justified. Public justification plays a central role in liberal theories which hold that political rules
or laws ought to be, “in some sense, justifiable or acceptable to all those persons over whom
the rules purport to have authority.”25 This insight, which received a thorough treatment in the
work of John Rawls, is that publicly justified laws are necessary “for there to exist over time a
just and stable society of free and equal citizens who still remain profoundly divided by
reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. . .”26 While I do adopt Vallier’s public
justification framework going forward, I do not directly argue that it is the appropriate
interpretation of what liberal political theory entails as doing so would be beyond the scope of
this paper.

25

Jonathan Quong, "Public Reason," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N.
Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/public-reason/>.
26
See John Rawls, Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 47.
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The framework which Vallier set out is in the public justification tradition because he
asserted that if the four conditions he laid out are met, then the exemption in question is
publicly justified. Vallier argued that there are four conditions which, if met, warrant a religious
exemption for any particular person:27
(a) if she has sufficient intelligible reason to oppose the law, (b) if the law imposes
unique and substantial burdens on the integrity of those exempted that are not off-set
by comparable benefits, (c) if the large majority of citizens have sufficient reason to
endorse the law, and (d) if the exemption does not impose significant costs on other
parties that require redress. If these four conditions are met, then legislative and/or
judicial bodies morally should carve out an exemption for those requesting them.28
In explicating and modifying these conditions, I analyze a current case before the Supreme
Court of the United States, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. While
Vallier did suggest that his account may require granting an exemption to religious businesses
like Masterpiece Cakeshop, it is my goal in this paper to make this argument explicit.29
2.1. A Look at Masterpiece Cakeshop

27

I am using the term ‘person’ here in the legal and not philosophical sense of the word. Whatever philosophers
mean by the concept, I am following the Dictionary Act in that my use of the word includes “corporations,
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In 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins visited Masterpiece Cakeshop and requested
that Jack Phillips design and create a cake to celebrate their same-sex wedding. Phillips
declined, advising Craig and Mullins that he did not provide wedding cakes for same-sex
weddings due to his religious beliefs. While he told them that he would create and provide
them with any other baked goods other than a wedding cake, they left the shop without
purchasing anything and without discussing any potential wedding cake designs with Phillips.
Craig and Mullins later filed charges of discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Division.
Phillips was found guilty of violating the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) for
discriminating against Craig and Mullins because of their sexual orientation.30
A. Sufficient and Intelligible Reasons
The first condition which Vallier set out is that persons requesting an exemption must
have “sufficient intelligible reason to oppose the law.”31 He wrote that “when public reason
liberals say that someone has sufficient reason to endorse a law or policy, they typically mean
that the balance of her justificatory reasons favors the policy.”32 The same is true for when
citizens oppose laws. For someone to have sufficient reason to oppose a law or policy, the
balance of their justificatory reasons must favor opposing the law or policy in question. The
concept of ‘justificatory reasons’ is often subject to idealization. Vallier proposed a moderate
form of idealization in defending his account. For one’s reasons to serve as justificatory under
this moderate idealization, they must be epistemically justified and arrived at via sound rules of
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inference. They must also be logically consistent or, at the very least, not obviously
inconsistent.33
The reasons which can serve as epistemic defeaters to laws are also constrained by the
intelligibility requirement. The intelligibility requirement can be stated as follows:
Intelligibility: A’s reason X is intelligible for members of the public if and only if members
of the public regard X as epistemically justified for A according to A’s evaluative
standards.34
This definition of intelligibility illustrates that, for a reason to be intelligible to the public, it is
not necessary that members of the public accept the reason themselves. For instance, an
atheist can see beliefs based on the Bible as epistemically justified for Christians because many
Christians take the Bible as authoritative or properly basic. For instance, if we look at the facts
of Masterpiece Cakeshop, it is uncontested that Phillips has been a Christian for over thirty
years and believes in Jesus Christ as his Lord and Savior.35 Being a Christian for Phillips likely
includes the belief that the Bible is an authoritative text on issues of morality and how one
should live one’s life. Because the Bible proclaims the sinfulness of same-sex relationships,36
Phillips believes that facilitating same-sex marriages by designing and providing wedding cakes
for them would make him complicit in sin and would “displease God.”37 This is an intelligible
belief for him to have even if we do not accept the assumptions implicit in his worldview.
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The Bible also expresses a straightforward prohibition on males having sexual
relationships with other males when it states that “if a man lies with a male as with a woman,
both of them have committed an abomination.”38 As marriage often includes, in part, a sexual
relationship, Phillips does not want to facilitate such a relationship which he sees as prohibited
by his religious ideology. CADA compels him to do this. Thus, he has an intelligible reason to
oppose the law as applied to him.
One possible objection to the intelligibility requirement is that it might seem to be too
easy to fulfill. For instance, consider a fictional baker who does not believe that certain types of
human beings are people. He justifies this by appealing to a religious text, much like the appeal
to Biblical scripture. Furthermore, he firmly believes that only people have birthdays and that it
would be morally wrong to provide birthday cakes for non-people. Doing so would require him
to go against his religious convictions. Must we see this as an intelligible reason? Assuming for
the sake of argument that it does actually follow from a straightforward reading of the fictional
text that certain classes of human beings are not really people and that providing birthday
cakes to them would be in violation of religious prescriptions, the response would seem to be
yes. But those readers tempted to endorse this objection may not fully appreciate that
intelligible reasons are not dispositive. We can maintain that all sorts of intelligible reasons can
serve as justificatory under this model but yet do not warrant granting exemptions on account
of them. For this objection to be compelling, this framework would have to allow exemptions to
pass muster which would have consequences that liberals would seemingly not be able to
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endorse given their philosophical commitments. But that would require an additional argument
rather than the insistence that the intelligibility requirement is too permissive.
The third condition is that the large majority of citizens have sufficient reason to
endorse the law. The reason for this condition is that the appropriate thing for legislators to do
if the majority of citizens did not have sufficient reason to endorse the law would be to work to
repeal it, not craft specialized exemptions to it. Courts and legal scholars have noted several
purposes underlying anti-discrimination laws. Here I simply note them and assume that they
serve as sufficient reasons that a majority of people have to support public accommodation
laws. The purposes are as follows (in no particular order): 1) to ensure and maintain equal
access to publicly available goods and services, 2) to eradicate barriers to the equal treatment
of all citizens in the public marketplace, 3) to stigmatize the practice of discrimination in the
public marketplace, 4) to maintain the social order, and 5) to prevent dignitary harm.
B. Integrity and Substantial Burdens
The second condition is that “the law imposes unique and substantial burdens on the
integrity of those exempted that are not off-set by comparable benefits.”39 Vallier defined a
substantial burden as “one that significantly sets back one’s capacity to advance her interests
and core ideals and doctrines.”40 A person has integrity “when she is true to her character,
projects, plans and beliefs.”41 This definition of integrity draws upon Loren Lomasky’s account
of persons and projects. Briefly stated, Lomasky defines projects as those ends “which reach
indefinitely into the future, play a central role within the ongoing endeavors of the individual,
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and provide a significant degree of structural stability to an individual’s life.”42 As these projects
provide structural stability to our lives, they are partially constitutive of our personal identities.
Furthermore, because they are partially constitutive of our identities, our personal integrity is
threatened when the government passes laws which impede our ability to accomplish these
ends.
My claim is that the personal integrity of Phillips is burdened by the application of
Colorado’s public accommodation law. There are two ways in which CADA burdens his integrity.
The first is that it undermines his ability to live according to what he believes are mandates of
his religion. Obviously, I will not attempt to detail, nor do I pretend to know, most of Phillips’
religious beliefs or commitments. However, as stated earlier, part of his web of projects and
beliefs is likely substantially related to his identity as a Christian. He “believes that decorating
cakes is a form of art, that he can honor God through his artistic talents, and that he would
displease God by creating cakes for same-sex marriages.”43 Assuming that his beliefs on this
matter are sincere, it is clear that compelling him to use his artistic skills to create wedding
cakes for same-sex couples compels him to violate what he takes to be a mandate of his
religion. As Christianity is a core doctrine which plays a central role within his ongoing
endeavors, CADA burdens his personal integrity by undermining his ability to successfully
pursue a project which is central to his identity. In other words, the law compelling him to serve
same-sex couples undermines his ability to live out his convictions as a Christian.
I take this first way in which public accommodation laws can burden the personal
integrity of wedding vendors to be relatively uncontroversial. If personal integrity involves
42
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being true to one’s beliefs and there is a law which compels individuals to do something in
direct violation of what they believe to be a religious obligation, then such a law undermines
their integrity by circumventing their ability to live a life fully consonant with their religious
identity. The second way, however, is more controversial and it involves the claim that
compelling certain wedding vendors to serve same-sex couples is, in effect, compelling them to
express a message which they disagree with. In arguing for this claim, I draw significantly from
the Supreme Court’s free speech jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has historically recognized
that the First Amendment protects a speaker’s “autonomy to choose the content of his own
message and, conversely, to decide what not to say”44 and that no citizen should be compelled
to express by word or act any particular opinion which they disagree with.45 CADA both
undermines Phillips’ autonomy as a speaker and compels him to express a particular opinion
which he finds disagreeable.
Courts have generally rejected the argument that wedding vendors are compelled to
express a message when they are forced to comply with public accommodation laws.46 In
rejecting this argument, courts often insist that treating same-sex couples on a par with
opposite-sex couples is not inherently expressive conduct, does not express a message of
approval for same-sex marriage and is merely showing compliance with operative antidiscrimination laws. I maintain that this conclusion is incorrect regarding Masterpiece
Cakeshop. I further claim that the compelled conduct at play in Masterpiece Cakeshop –
designing and creating wedding cakes for same-sex couples – expresses a particular message
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which Phillips does not endorse. This burdens his integrity by divorcing his personal convictions
from the content of his expression. Alternatively, it requires him to “dis-integrate [his] creativity
and [his] conscience.”47
In beginning this inquiry into whether the regulated conduct is deserving of First
Amendment protections, courts have had to ascertain whether the conduct is expressive. While
the text of the First Amendment extends protection to ‘speech’ only, courts have “long
recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or written word.”48 In other words,
courts have interpreted the Free Speech clause to protect conduct which constitutes expression
of ideas. A working definition of these acts of expression has been provided by Thomas Scanlon
when he wrote that “any act that is intended by its agent to communicate to one or more
persons some proposition or attitude” can be considered an act of expression.49
The Supreme Court, however, has rejected the view “that an apparently limitless variety
of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends
thereby to express an idea.”50 Instead, the Court has opted to extend First Amendment
protection only to conduct which is deemed ‘inherently expressive.’51 In Spence v. Washington,
the Court developed a test to discern when conduct ought to be deemed ‘inherently
expressive.’ I adopt this test because I believe that it provides us with a judicable framework.
There are two prongs to the test the Court developed. First, the speaker must have intended to
send a particularized message by the conduct. Second, the audience must have understood the
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message being sent.52 The test was restated in Texas v. Johnson as requiring that an “intent to
convey a particularized message was present” and “the likelihood was great that the message
would be understood by those who viewed it.”53
Considering the first prong, it is not clear how particular the intended message must be.
The Court has stated that “a narrow succinctly articulable message is not a condition of
constitutional protection” as such an interpretation would not reach “the unquestionably
shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of
Lewis Carroll.”54 Other than insisting that the ‘particularized message’ requirement should not
be interpreted too narrowly, the Court has said little else regarding how it should be positively
interpreted. There is likely no clear and uncontroversial line to be drawn between messages
which are ‘particular’ and messages which are too general to warrant First Amendment
protections under this test. What I propose is that the first prong of the test can and should be
understood in light of the second. To reiterate, the second prong is that the audience
understood the message being intentionally communicated by the conduct in question. We can
understand the content of the message conveyed by analyzing what likely message would be
understood by the audience who viewed it. If it is determined that there is a likely message
which would be understood by those who viewed it, the conduct should be deemed inherently
expressive.
Carolina Corbin has defended a similar understanding of the test set forth in Spence. She
has argued that courts should try to decipher whether particular conduct has what she called a
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‘social meaning.’ ‘Social meaning,’ according to Corbin, is “the meaning society attaches to
particular conduct in a particular time and place.”55 In analyzing Masterpiece Cakeshop, we
have to analyze whether a wedding cake, or, more specifically, whether the process of creating
one for a specific couple, has a meaning that is understood by society in the current
contemporary context. I maintain that it does and that compelling Phillips to design and create
wedding cakes for same-sex couples compels him to express a message which is contrary to his
religious convictions.
Most of the courts and legal scholars commenting on this case and others like it argue
that the message being expressed by the act of making a wedding cake and of providing goods
or services to same-sex weddings more generally, if there is one, is approval of same-sex
marriage. Thus, proponents of exemptions have argued that compelling wedding vendors with
religious objections to same-sex marriage amounts to compelling them to express an approval
of same-sex marriage. Opponents of exemptions, on the other hand, deny that serving samesex couples involves expressing such a message.
Opponents of exemptions are correct to deny that serving same-sex couples involves
expressing a message of approval for same-sex marriage but they are incorrect in the assertion
that it involves no expression at all. This is because they are incorrect regarding the actual social
meaning underlying the production and sale of certain products or services to same-sex couples
planning wedding celebrations. The actual social meaning and, thus, the message being
expressed by the conduct is the recognition that same-sex marriages are, in fact, marriages. I
will now turn to the specific arguments as they relate to the design and sale of wedding cakes.
55
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Masterpiece Cakeshop and Phillips argue that the sale of wedding cakes to same-sex
couples expresses a message of approval for same-sex marriage. Those opposing Masterpiece
Cakeshop’s claim correctly point out that “the business context essentially neutralizes any
potential message of endorsement” for same-sex marriage.56 In other words, during the normal
course of business, reasonable observers of business transactions would likely not come to the
conclusion that the mere act of selling a product or service expressed a message of approval on
the part of the business for either the customer purchasing it, the event it is being purchased
for or the conduct taking place at the event. In fact, it seems likely that many businesses are
regularly unaware of the details regarding the particular events they provide goods or services
for.
What I claim, however, is that a message of approval is not the message which would be
likely understood by those who observed the conduct of custom-making a wedding cake. That
is, a message of approval is not the social meaning of the design, creation and sale of a custommade wedding cake to a same-sex couple. This is because the business transaction includes a
unique creative dimension (namely the fact that the cake is custom-made for a specific couple)
and involves the creation of a symbolic product. When Phillips begins the process of creating a
wedding cake, he has an in-depth “consultation with the customer(s) in order to get to know
their desires, their personalities, their personal preferences and learn about their wedding
ceremony and celebration.”57 Furthermore, Phillips considers himself an artist and custommakes all of his wedding cakes. He determines the design of the cake through his consultation

56

Ibid., 244.
Reply in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission (No. 16-111).
57

26

with the customer(s) and then uses his artistic talents to sculpt what can be called a ‘temporary
sculpture’ which will serve as a central component of the wedding celebration. A wedding cake
is not merely a dessert and its purpose is not merely to fulfill the guests’ appetites after the
main meal.58 It is a symbolic representation meant to communicate a celebratory message.59 As
was written in the petition for the Supreme Court to accept the case, a couple slicing a wedding
cake plays a communicative role in signifying that the couple is now married, “slicing a pizza or
a pot roast would not have the same effect.”60
Not only do wedding cakes play a communicative role at the celebration, but weddings
are inherently expressive events. Echoing some points made in the Obergefell opinion by
Justice Kennedy, Helen Alvare wrote that
marital “status” is the legal and social recognition that the marital union is specially
favored because it forms the “keystone of the social order,” is the most favorable and
stable place for sexual expression and childrearing, and is a public sign of fidelity,
permanence, maturity and social responsibility. It is because state-recognized marriage
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legally possesses and communicated such a status that over a thousand state benefits
flow to it, and myriad obligations attach to it as well.61
Alvare went on to say that “state-sanctioned same-sex marriage communicates the perfect
equality of same- and opposite-sex married unions.”62 It is precisely because marital status
communicates these messages that marriage equality for same-sex couples is desirable and,
according to Kennedy, required by the Constitution. Because wedding cakes communicate a
celebratory message about the marriage, they also communicate an implicit celebratory
message about the messages which the marital status itself communicates.
Where proponents of exemptions have faltered in their arguments is when they insist
that the celebratory message communicated by wedding cakes can be easily attributed to the
baker who made the cake. It is possible that, in preparing wedding cakes for engaged couples,
Phillips is happy for the couple, approving of their union and may even feel joy on behalf of
them. But it is not at all clear that a reasonable observer would likely interpret his conduct in
this way or even that his other customers would. For instance, consider a high-class baker in
Manhattan who exclusively creates custom-made cakes. When a customer asks him to create
an extravagant birthday cake, are we to believe that, in making the cake, he is thereby
expressing a celebratory message to the individual who is ultimately going to receive it?
Consider another example brought up in oral arguments for Masterpiece Cakeshop. If a
husband bought a cake which contained the text ‘I’m Sorry,’ would the baker then take
responsibility for the apologetic message being communicated.63 What should we think that the
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baker has to apologize for? It seems unlikely that reasonable observers would come to the
conclusion that the baker automatically adopts the celebratory or apologetic message just
because such a message was expressed by a product he created and sold.
But the social meaning behind a baker like Phillips sitting down with a couple, discussing
their aesthetic and culinary preferences, what type of wedding they are having and then using
his artistic talents to design and creating a wedding cake specifically customized for them is not
one of approval but of recognition. That is, by doing all of this, he is expressing the message
that he recognizes the event he is making the wedding cake for as a bona fide wedding. In other
words, the message he would be expressing is “that a wedding has occurred, a marriage has
begun and the couple should be celebrated.”64 Reasonable observers who are aware of the
process that Phillips undergoes when he begins the process of creating a wedding cake would
likely come to the conclusion that, if he started the process of creating a cake for a same-sex
wedding, that he recognized it as an actual wedding. This recognition is the message he is being
compelled to express by Colorado’s public accommodation law and it is one with which he
disagrees.
The reason expressing this message is so unconscionable and disagreeable to Phillips
and others is that, while federal and state governments are now required by law to recognize
same-sex marriages, many Christians do not believe that such marriages are legitimate. Indeed,
they believe that marriage is a sacred gift to humanity from God and is meant to only be
between one man and one woman. Many of them do not believe that same-sex marriages are
condoned by God and, thus, do not believe that same-sex marriages are ‘real’ marriages. This
64
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belief does not have to only rely on Biblical authority. For example, the official position of the
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops is that “relationships between two persons of the
same sex are not, and can never be, marriages.”65 But compelling Phillips to create a custommade wedding cake for a same-sex wedding is compelling him to express to the world that he
recognizes them as such. Just as a baker preparing a custom-made birthday cake expresses the
message that he is creating the cake for an actual birthday, a baker like Phillips, who only
creates custom-made wedding cakes, expresses the message that he judges same-sex weddings
to be bona fide weddings once he begins the process of creating a wedding cake for a same-sex
couple.
With all of this being said, one could still remain skeptical that the conduct of creating a
wedding cake, even a customized one for a particular couple, rises to the level of genuinely
expressive conduct. It might still be claimed that the message of recognition is subsumed by the
commercial context in which it is purportedly expressed. That is, it is open for opponents of
exemptions in these cases to argue that reasonable observers would likely not see the design
and sale of wedding cakes as a message of recognition but rather as mere compliance with
public accommodation laws. I will offer a brief rejoinder to this line of argument which concerns
the contemporary social context. At the time of writing this paper, it has been about three
years since marriage equality was granted to same-sex couples in Obergefell. Since then, the
ruling and its consequences have been much discussed in mainstream and academic literature.
Although I believe that the ruling in Obergefell was positive, there remains a significant portion
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of American citizens who believe that unions between members of the same-sex are immoral.
Furthermore, public accommodation laws like the ones implicated in New Mexico and Colorado
are not in place in all parts of the country. An idealized ‘reasonable person,’ much less the
average citizen, should not be assumed to recognize that a business providing goods or services
for same-sex weddings is merely complying with extant anti-discrimination laws as the laws
themselves are inconsistent in their application.
In short, what I maintain is that there are two social conditions which give credence to
the idea that a reasonable observer would likely see a business providing a customized good for
a same-sex wedding as recognition of that wedding: the fact that same-sex marriages are still
objectionable to a significant minority of citizens and the fact that anti-discrimination provisions
are inconsistently applied across jurisdictions. Stories about businesses refusing to facilitate
same-sex wedding ceremonies have become popular in the news media so it is likely that
citizens who observe businesses not doing that believe that such businesses recognize the
legitimacy of same-sex marriages. This is bolstered by the fact that current anti-discrimination
protections for the LGBTQ community are currently represented by a patchwork of provisions
rather than a consistent scheme. As stated earlier, it cannot merely be assumed that a business
providing goods or services for same-sex weddings is merely complying with public
accommodation laws because there are many areas in the United States where that is not what
the law actually requires.
It may seem paradoxical that the inconsistency of anti-discrimination laws would
provide a reason for certain businesses to be exempt from them.66 However, I maintain that
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this inconsistency in conjunction with the fact that a significant minority of citizens still vocally
object to same-sex marriage reflects the current state of the debate. If a vocal minority
disagreed with the institution of same-sex marriage yet the federal law prohibited all
businesses from refusing service on the basis of sexual orientation (so the federal law just
extended the set of protected characteristics), it may be that reasonable observers would
interpret Phillips conduct as merely following the law. But the fact that sexual orientation is not
a protected characteristic reflects the current debate in the legal literature. That is, scholars are
still debating whether sexual orientation should be a protected characteristic. In addition, there
is an ongoing policy debate regarding the appropriate scope of anti-discrimination laws. Thus, it
is not merely that public accommodation laws are inconsistent which gives us a reason to
exempt certain businesses but that this inconsistency reflects the fact that there is a live public
debate regarding the validity of same-sex marriage as an institution as well as the place of
sexual orientation in anti-discrimination law. Compelling businesses to express a message of
recognition is compelling them to express that they have a particular opinion in the ongoing
disputes about the legitimacy of same-sex marriage when they do not (or even when they have
hold an opposing opinion). This is a straightforward violation of their freedom of expression.
Thus, a message of recognition is the social meaning attached to Phillips’ conduct and it
is a message he disagrees with. CADA compels him to design and create wedding cakes for
same-sex couples if he does so for opposite-sex couples and this has the effect of undermining
his ability both as a speaker and as an artist to autonomously choose the expressive content of
his artistry. It also burdens his integrity by divorcing the expressive content of his artistic
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process from his personal identity and from his goal of creating artwork the expression of which
is consistent with Christian principles.
Thus far, I have argued that there are two related ways in which public accommodation
laws burden the integrity of religious wedding vendors. The first is that the vendors may believe
that facilitating same-sex marriages in any way, even by merely providing goods or services to
same-sex couples, is a violation of their religious conscience and the law compels them to be so
violative. I spent relatively little time arguing for this claim as I believe it is rather
uncontroversial. If a central project of mine is to live according to the tenets of a particular
religion and a law compels me to violate those tenets, then the law burdens my integrity by
undermining my ability to pursue that project. This is essentially analogous to the facts of
Masterpiece Cakeshop.
The second way in which public accommodation laws can potentially burden the
integrity of wedding vendors is by compelling creative wedding vendors to engage in expressive
conduct which expresses a message they do not believe. CADA does this in the case of
Masterpiece Cakeshop by compelling Phillips to express a message of recognition for same-sex
marriages. However, even if the law is a burden to Phillips’ personal integrity, the question
remains whether that burden is substantial or unique. Vallier’s definition of substantial burdens
as significant setbacks to one’s capacity to advance one’s interests is not particularly insightful
as it requires us to further ask what we mean by a setback being ‘significant.’ This is not a fault
in Vallier’s framework as an answer to the question of whether a burden is substantial or
significant would most likely depend on a case-by-case analysis. It is also a question courts have
to deal with on a regular basis – particularly in cases having to do with religious liberty claims.
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There are a couple of methods by which courts and legislators can determine whether a
burden is substantial. The first is to look at the theological or religious substantiality of the
burden. The second is to assess the substantiality of the civil penalties triggered by one’s
religious exercise.67 While there are legal reasons to prefer one method over the other, we do
not need to choose just one as a conjunctive analysis will allow us to see if a burden is
substantial in the full sense of the term. Furthermore, I maintain that public accommodation
laws do substantially burden certain wedding vendors according to this conjunctive analysis.
There are perhaps legal and prudential reasons why courts should avoid doing an
analysis into the theological or religious substantiality of burdens imposed by secular laws. For
one, such an analysis would raise Establishment Clause concerns as some theories of the
Establishment Clause forbid courts from looking into the theology of any particular religion
while adjudicating cases.68 Even if such analyses did not raise any constitutional questions,
courts are not in a good position to do any type of theological analysis. Simply put, judges and
jurists are not trained to delve into matters of theology or religious studies. Undertaking an
analysis into the theology of a specific religion may also cause courts to favor more popular and
mainstream religions as they are the most familiar. This would put minority religions at a
disadvantage in the courts.69 In addition to the theological or religious burdens, there is also the
question of how substantial the civil penalties triggered by religious exercise are. This could be
measured financially, by the amount of jail or prison time or by the substantiality of any other
penalty incurred.
67

Michael A. Helfand, “Identifying Substantial Burdens,” University of Illinois Law Review (2016).
Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) and Hernandez v.
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680,699 (1989).
69
There is empirical backing to this worry. See Gregory C. Sisk and Michael Heise, “Muslims and Religious Liberty in
the Era of 9/11: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts,” Iowa Law Review 98 (2012).
68

34

Regarding the religious substantiality of the burden, there is good reason to give a
significant amount of deference to the individual being purportedly burdened in analyzing
whether a burden is substantial. As already stated, courts are not in a good position to judge
the theological merit of specific claims. It is also not the case that courts should refer to the
official doctrines of a particular sect as an authority and hold these doctrines as central to every
practicing member of that sect. For instance, it is possible for a sect to recognize same-sex
marriages but for a member of that sect to have a different interpretation of the Bible and to
believe that same-sex marriage is sinful. Courts and legislators should not enforce modes of
orthodoxy by concluding that a burden is substantial only if the burden is related to a central
theological or religious doctrine of an established sect.
Given that we ought to give deference to what individuals perceive as central to their
religion in analyzing the religious substantiality of a particular burden, there is good reason to
believe that public accommodation laws do impose a substantial burden to the integrity of
religious wedding vendors.70 Such vendors often have to make a choice between following the
dictates of their conscience and following the law. Alternatively, they could make the decision
to get out of the business altogether. But this both undermines their projects – if such projects
include running a business in line with their religious commitments – and potentially has
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significant financial costs.71 The civil penalties imposed on wedding vendors for being found in
violation of public accommodation laws is also often pretty substantial, sometimes resulting in
fines up to $10,000.72
The burdens vendors face is also unique because it only applies to vendors with religious
objections to same-sex marriage. Atheists or other religious believers who do not have such
objections would not have a similar objection to facilitating same-sex weddings. They would
therefore not be burdened with the compelled choice between following their perceived
religious obligations, following the law or giving up on their projects by forfeiting their business.
Again, if the burden imposed was not unique in this way but was generally applicable, then the
correct approach would be to work to repeal the law in question unless it was justified by
overriding state interests.

§3. Narrowly-Tailored Exemptions and Compelling State Interests
In this section, I discuss the remaining conditions to be found in Vallier’s framework.
Concluding that a burden is substantial and unique is not dispositive of whether an individual
ought to be granted an exemption. Vallier also stipulated that burdens on one’s integrity may
be off-set by comparable benefits. There is also the requirement that the exemption does not
impose significant costs on other parties which require redress. Before I discuss these
conditions in detail, however, I wish to suggest why the exemptions I defend would be
narrowly-tailored. This is important because proponents of exemptions often utilize theories of
exemptions which are too broad. If a scheme of exemptions is too broad, then it is more likely
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that the purposes of public accommodation laws would be undermined by applying it. This, in
turn, makes it more likely that courts or legislators should reject such a scheme. In defending a
principle or rule which would separate vendors who deserve exemptions from those who do
not, it is important to weigh competing interests – that is, the interests of the vendors against
the interests of same-sex couples or, alternatively, the interests of the vendors against
competing state interests.
This recognition that any scheme of exemptions ought to be narrowly-tailored for the
explicit purpose of not undermining the goals of anti-discrimination laws is a weakness in
Vallier’s account. At the very least, it marks his account as potentially incomplete. Vallier
seemed to be focused on developing a model of when exemptions are warranted in individual
cases. But when appellate courts, particularly the Supreme Court, analyze cases, they have to
be aware that they are also developing doctrines and rules that will potentially be applied to
future cases. It is quite likely that offering one vendor an exemption would have virtually no
effect on the general purposes of public accommodation laws and would not harm the samesex couple being denied service in a tangible way. But courts must be cognizant of when they
are potentially setting precedent and providing the same exemption to several hundred
vendors under a developed rule may in fact undermine the purpose of public accommodation
law. This is why it is important to make sure that any scheme of exemptions is narrowlytailored. We should look beyond whether harm or an undermining of existing law is present in
one particular case and analyze whether such harm would be present if the principle used to
decide the case was applied universally.
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Kristen Waggoner, a lead attorney for Masterpiece Cakeshop, attempted to draw a line
between wedding vendors who deserve exemptions and those which do not. In response to
questioning from the justices during oral arguments, she suggested that florists, invitation
designers and jewelers should be granted exemptions along with Masterpiece Cakeshop but
that hair stylists, makeup artists, chefs and tailors should not be. This was because, according to
Waggoner, the latter four are not engaged in speech or expressive conduct.73 Justice Kagan
presented an unappealing (and I believe inaccurate) representation of Waggoner’s argument
when she asserted that Waggoner and other defenders of Masterpiece Cakeshop hold the view
“that a cake can be speech because it involves great skill and artistry.”74 This begs the question
why hair stylists and makeup artists would not also be engaged in expressive conduct as their
craft can also involve great skill and artistic merit. As my argument above suggests, however,
while designing and creating a wedding cake does involve a certain amount of skill and artistry,
that alone is not sufficient to deem it expressive conduct. It is expressive conduct because it
involves creativity and artistry on the part of the vendor and because there is a social meaning
attached to custom-making a wedding cake for a same-sex couple. The question of whether the
business is creative or artistic should not be seen as dispositive. The business also has to be
judged to be engaged in inherently expressive conduct according to the tests which the Court
itself set out.
This point introduces the first category of vendors which warrant exemptions – vendors
whose conduct is deemed as inherently expressive. I concluded earlier that the conduct of
making a wedding cake is expressive conduct because it is artistic and creative and because
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neutral observers would likely see Phillip’s process of designing and creating a wedding cake for
a same-sex couple as recognition that the couple would soon become a legitimately married
couple. This is in no small part due to the fact that Phillips only provided custom-made wedding
cakes. If he provided pre-made wedding cakes or if he had a catalog of cakes for customers to
choose from, then the case may warrant a different conclusion. But we should not say, like
some commentators have, that “customization marks the line between expression and
impermissible discrimination.”75 The salient point is not merely that the product is custommade but that the process of custom-making the product expresses a particular message. While
I maintain that this is the case with Masterpiece Cakeshop, it is not the case with all vendors
who provide customized products or services.
The set of members of this first category of vendors is somewhat vague – intentionally
so. Courts and legislators would have to be careful in granting exemptions under this criterion.
Some of the justices in oral arguments, as well as the solicitors involved, have illustrated
misunderstandings about what is actually at issue in these types of cases. It is not the creativity
and artistry of the product or service which triggers free speech concerns but whether the
creative conduct itself, in the surrounding social context, can be seen as expressing a particular
message. Furthermore, the message is not one of approval but of recognition. Where this
category is vague, similar to many other jurisprudentially crafted categories, is at the
boundaries. Do tailors express recognition of same-sex weddings when they create suits or
tuxedos? My intuition is that they do not but it might be a different story for a bridal boutique
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which only provides custom-made wedding gowns or a wedding photographer who insists that,
in taking pictures of weddings, she is thereby telling a celebratory story about the union.76
Either way, an analysis into social meaning would have to be undertaken in each of these cases
and it is my view that the amount of wedding vendors who actually belong in this category is
relatively low – far lower than proponents or opponents of exemptions generally recognize.
The second category does not have to do with the expression of wedding vendors but in
their active participation in the celebration or ceremony. Because of this, it has no bearing on
Masterpiece Cakeshop but should be considered regardless. This category would include those
vendors who, by providing their services, are active participants in the wedding ceremony. A
paradigmatic example would be an officiant who offers her services to the public. As stated
earlier, I believe that there is good reason to give a fair amount of deference to individuals in
figuring out whether they are substantially burdened relative to their religious obligations. But
when it comes to analyzing whether substantial burdens warrant exemptions in these types of
cases, we should be a bit more measured to make sure that the exemptions are not too broad.
For instance, a restaurant owner might have a religious objection to desegregating their
restaurants. While the Biblical basis for this is dubious, let us assume that there is a religion
whose sacred text can be reasonably read as mandating the separate and unequal treatment of
individuals based on their race. Granting exemptions based on that reasoning to everybody
who claims to believe such reasons would undermine the purpose of the federal public
accommodation statute and the anti-discrimination principle expressed in the 14th Amendment.
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Similarly, we ought not to give every vendor an exemption simply because they believe that
serving same-sex couples is a violation of their religious commitments.
The point behind this category is to allow for the narrow-tailoring of a scheme of
exemptions. As the objections are usually framed as objections to the event – that is, the
wedding celebration – we should take more seriously the claims of vendors who are compelled
by law to actively participate in the event. Just like the previous category, this category is vague
at the boundaries and would have to be worked out in practice. For instance, a band hired to
perform at a wedding can be said to be participating at the event by providing entertainment
but it is not entirely clear whether a caterer is participating by providing the meal or whether a
property owner is participating by providing the venue. As is the case with the first category, I
expect that this category would be quite narrower than some defenders of exemptions suggest.
For instance, if all one does is rent out a property that one owns, I do not think it makes much
sense to say that he is thereby a participant in the ceremony as it is unlikely that most people
attending would even be aware of his or her existence.
Although this category is vague, there are two rough-and-ready rules to determine
when a vendor is not an active participant in a wedding ceremony or celebration. First, if the
vendor is not present at the ceremony, there is no sense in which he or she is participating in it.
This excludes quite a bit of retail stores who claim that facilitating same-sex marriages is a
violation of their free exercise of religion. Due to the large amount of religious doctrines, their
beliefs on this issue may very well be sincere but we should not allow exemptions to every
retail store who claims to have a religious objection to same-sex marriage. Second, if it is likely
that attendees would never see you or notice your presence at the ceremony, it is equally likely
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that you are not participating in the ceremony. This excludes certain employees at venues,
property managers or any businesses or staff whose job may involve them working in
conjunction with the ceremony taking place but cannot be properly said to be participating in
it.
3.1. Compelling State Interests
Earlier in the paper, I noted the purposes underlying public accommodation laws and I
will repeat them here. They are: 1) to ensure and maintain equal access to publicly available
goods and services, 2) to eradicate barriers to the equal treatment of all citizens in the public
marketplace, 3) to maintain the social order, 4) to stigmatize the practice of discrimination in
the public marketplace and 5) to prevent dignitary harms. I assume going forward that the
government has an interest in fulfilling these purposes and I will also assume for the sake of
argument that the government’s interest in fulfilling these purposes is compelling. My
argument is that applying public accommodation laws to the vendors in the above two
categories is not necessary in order to achieve them.
The first purpose is to maintain equal access to publicly available goods and services.
The concept ‘equal access’ includes two further concepts which need to be explicated. First is
the issue of ‘access.’ It is undisputed that the couple who was refused service by Masterpiece
Cakeshop received a rainbow themed wedding cake free of charge from another baker. Thus,
access to wedding cakes was not a problem in this case. The same goes for many of these types
of cases. There are a large amount of various types of wedding vendors available and, if the
sample size of these cases is any indicator, same-sex couples generally do not have any
significant trouble finding a similar business if they are refused service by one. This suggests
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that access is not typically undermined by vendors refusing service on the basis of religious
objections to same-sex marriage. If access to goods or services would be prevented by granting
an exemption, then that should give judges and legislators pause before granting such an
exemption.
As many have pointed out in these cases, however, the interest the government has in
maintaining equal access is about more than the mere good or service which is being accessed.
Masterpiece Cakeshop is about more than access to wedding cake just like anti-discrimination
cases in the civil rights era were about more than access to burgers. This brings us to the
second interest which the state has: eradicating barriers to the equal treatment of minorities in
the public marketplace. The concept of equality presents difficulties, however, as such a
concept could warrant different descriptive and normative descriptions depending on one’s
perspective. One might describe the conduct of Phillips as treating all of his customers equally
as he would not sell any person, regardless of sexual orientation, products or services which
involve him expressing recognition of the legitimacy of same-sex marriage. On the other hand,
it is reasonable to interpret his conduct as treating same-sex couples unequally as he generally
designs and creates wedding cakes for opposite-sex couples whenever he is requested to. In
that sense, he is treating same-sex couples unequally.
Although both views are plausible, I adopt the former view and propose that the type of
unequal treatment that the government should be cognizant of are businesses refusing service
solely on the basis of protected characteristics. Vendors who fall in either of the two categories
I set out are not refusing service based solely on a protected characteristic. Rather, they are
refusing service either because they do not want to participate in conduct they find
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objectionable or they do not want to be compelled to express a message that they recognize
such conduct as valid or legitimate.
To be sure, courts have rejected this type of conduct/identity distinction before. When
vendors argue that they are not discriminating on the basis of a protected characteristic (in this
case, sexual orientation) but are refusing service because they do not wish to associate
themselves with certain conduct (i.e., a same-sex wedding), courts have replied that the
conduct is so intertwined with the identity of the individual that they are effectively
discriminating on the basis of one’s identity. This relies on a particular understanding of when a
business can be said to be discriminating against somebody because of a protected
characteristic. Courts hearing these cases have generally maintained that, for a business to
discriminate against an individual because of a protected characteristic means that, but for the
fact that they have this particular characteristic, they would not have been refused service.
Because same-sex marriage is so tied into one’s sexual orientation, but for the fact that these
couples are gay, they would not have been denied service.
I am willing to concede that this is the appropriate way to analyze whether conduct is
discriminatory. This is why I reject arguments to the effect that Masterpiece Cakeshop is not
discriminating against same-sex couples when Phillips refuses to provide them with wedding
cakes. But to the question of whether providing narrowly-tailored exemptions would
undermine the compelling state interest in maintaining equal treatment, the answer is no. For
instance, Masterpiece Cakeshop would similarly refuse to sell a wedding cake to a heterosexual
individual if he knew that it was going to go to a same-sex wedding. To make this example seem
more plausible, consider a same-sex couple who enlists a family member or friend to purchase
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a wedding cake for their wedding. The friend goes to a baker and, during the exchange, the
baker figures out that he is being requested to design a cake for a same-sex wedding. Because
of this, he declines to make one. This would seem to be a perfectly legal thing for the baker to
do considering the general language of public accommodation statutes which typically states
that businesses cannot refuse service based on the sexual orientation of the customer. But if it
is not the customer’s sexual orientation the baker objects to but rather the message attached
to creating a wedding cake for such an event or the fact that he is being asked to participate in
the event, it ceases to be unequal treatment based solely on one’s sexual orientation. Such an
example gives credence to the idea that the conduct/identity distinction is not as much of an
error as courts make it appear. Because businesses can generally refuse to provide goods or
services which involve them expressing a disagreeable message or which involves them
participating in a religious ceremony which they would rather not participate in, these vendors
are not treating same-sex couples unequally by refusing to provide goods or services for samesex weddings.
The third governmental interest is maintaining the social order. Terri Day and Danielle
Weatherby argued that allowing businesses to discriminate in the area of public
accommodations has measurable, adverse economic effects. This is also one of the arguments
that the Colorado Court of Appeals referred to in their opinion denying Masterpiece Cakeshop’s
claim. I allow for the fact that even a narrowly-tailored scheme of exemptions may have
significantly adverse economic effects and may even undermine the social order. Such an
argument would have to be backed up by empirical data, however. The Court of Appeals as well
as Day and Weatherby, in making this argument, appealed to a report published by the
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Michigan Department of Civil Rights. The fault with their line of argument is that the report
does not show what they purport it to show. The report does detail adverse economic and
societal effects due to a lack of anti-discrimination laws but, at the time, Michigan lacked any
adequate scheme of anti-discrimination regulations for the LGBTQ community, including in the
areas of employment and housing. In fact, the report explicitly states that its primary focus was
on “data related to employment protections.”77 As such, the primary focus of the report is not
on data related to discrimination in the realm of public accommodations which is what this case
is about.
The fourth purpose is to stigmatize the practice of unjust discrimination. Andrew
Koppelman argues convincingly that the antidiscrimination project is fundamentally a project of
cultural transformation.78 The ordinary status quo is that businesses can refuse service for any
reason that they wish. The federal public accommodation law was primarily enacted in order to
protect black Americans from being excluded from broad swaths of the marketplace due only
to the color of their skin. According to Koppelman, while the federal civil rights act had several
subsidiary purposes, its primary function was to rid society of the evils of structural racism. This
involved an attempt to transform the culture which is to say that one purpose of antidiscrimination laws was to rid people of racist beliefs and attitudes. Accordingly, public
accommodation statutes which include sexual orientation as a protected class are meant to rid
people of bigoted beliefs regarding homosexuals.
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As Koppelman points out, however, the project of cultural transformation is directly at
odds with a proposition that many liberals would readily assent to. That is, “part of what
defines a free society is that it is none of the government’s business what citizens believe and
that the shaping of citizens’ beliefs is not a legitimate task of a liberal state” is directly opposed
to the idea that “racism, sexism, and similar ideologies are so evil and destructive of the proper
workings of a free society that the state should do whatever it can to eradicate them.”79
Working out a solution to this supposed conflict is beyond the scope of this paper so let us
assume for the moment that it is a legitimate task of a liberal state to try to stamp out certain
illiberal ideologies such as racism, sexism, bigotry, etc. The question then would be whether
granting narrowly-tailored exemptions to wedding vendors would undermine that task.
One part of the cultural transformation project that is implicit in developing a scheme of
anti-discrimination regulations is the stigmatization of unjust discrimination. This is generally
done through a form of sanction. That is, if businesses are found to be guilty of violating a
public accommodation statute, they are liable to be fined or sued by the government or wouldbe customers. Alternatively, citizens might protest the business or stop going altogether. One
solution in these types of cases, according to Koppelman, is that wedding vendors “should be
exempted, but only if they are willing to bear the cost of publicly identifying themselves as
discriminatory.” In effect, this “will make discrimination rare almost everywhere.”80 This can be
seen as a form of sanction as it is likely that businesses publicly identifying as discriminatory
against same-sex couples would receive a large amount of backlash from their community and
throughout the country. This is, however, an empirical matter and whether it is true would
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have to be discovered after some exemptions were put in place. If it is not true that such
businesses would receive sanction or stigma from the larger community, then that may give us
good reason to reconsider applying the scheme of exemptions I defend.
One reason to think that businesses who ‘out themselves’ as discriminatory would
receive societal backlash is the cultural shift which has taken place regarding attitudes toward
same-sex unions and homosexuality more generally. According to the Pew Research Center,
support for same-sex marriage has been steadily growing over the last decade. For instance, in
2010, 48% of Americans opposed the legalization of gay marriage. Seven years later, 62% of all
Americans supported same-sex marriage. Support for same-sex marriage also significantly rises
among younger generations with 74% of Millennials (individuals born after 1980) being
supportive.81 If this trend holds, a large majority of Americans will support same-sex marriage in
the next 10-20 years.
The reason this data is relevant is because whether granting exemptions would
undermine the ability of the state to stigmatize unjust discrimination depends in large part on
the pervasiveness of discriminatory attitudes. For instance, if exemptions were allowed in the
civil rights era for business owners who were willing to post signs reading ‘We Don’t Serve
Blacks Here,’ it is arguable that there would be very little stigma associated with it. Similarly, in
an area of the country which is home to a particularly large amount of anti-gay prejudice,
posting a sign notifying the public that they do not serve same-sex couples would likely not
receive much pushback or outcry (at least not from the local community). But attitudes are
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changing and most people now look upon same-sex marriages in a favorable light. Additionally,
there has recently been a large amount of public outcry whenever legislators attempt to carve
out exemptions for business owners either in the language of anti-discrimination law or in
separate religious freedom statutes. This coupled with the prediction that only a small
percentage of business owners would likely risk the financial and reputational costs associated
with making one’s discriminatory practices public, the amount of wedding vendors who would
be effectively granted exemptions would be quite low indeed and would not substantially affect
the state’s ability to stigmatize discriminatory attitudes or undermine the cultural shift which is
already taking place. As stated earlier, however, this is an empirical claim and if it could be
shown that these narrow exemptions were taken advantage of by more businesses than
originally thought, and that cultural attitudes started to shift back in conjunction with them,
there would be a stronger case against granting any exemptions.
The final purpose of public accommodation laws is to prevent the dignitary harm which
accompanies unequal treatment in the public marketplace. While I assumed earlier that all of
the purposes I have been discussing are legitimate and compelling state interests, there is a fair
amount of controversy regarding the place of dignitary harms. For instance, Koppelman claimed
that “the dignitary harm of knowing that some of your fellow citizens condemn your way of life
is not one from which the law can or should protect you in a regime of free speech.”82 Vallier
also insisted that a notion of harm which includes denials of service “may be sectarian, and
therefore not a suitable basis for law.”83 According to Vallier, “on more traditional liberal views,
a denial of service will not count as harmful because, in nearly all of the relevant cases, gay and
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lesbian couples have dozens of affordable alternative venues to purchase wedding cakes.”84
Particularly in public justification models, a sectarian notion of harm is thought to be unsuitable
as a basis for law as it is not a notion that everybody can reasonably accept. However, just
because the traditional concept of harm which Vallier relies on is ‘traditional’ does not make it
any less sectarian. In addition we should acknowledge that dignity harms are referred to as
‘harms’ for a reason. I propose to conceive of dignitary harms as a specific type of harm which
occurs when the government does not protect from invidious discrimination against individuals
due solely to certain identity characteristics. This type of discrimination undermines the social
bases of self-respect which in turn undermines the capacity or ability of individuals to be fully
autonomous agents. I believe that the government does indeed have an interest in preventing
such harms but that the government does not need to categorically apply public
accommodation laws in order to fulfill it.
In order to cash out this claim, I require a notion of autonomy which is relatively
uncontroversial but which captures the central idea behind most liberal conceptions of what it
means for somebody to be an autonomous agent. There are many formulations of autonomy
which are sufficient for this purpose. These can include formulations such as “the ability to
reflect on the adequacy of one’s own moral reasons, and to distinguish one’s own reasons from
the reasons of others,”85 “an ideal of people deciding for themselves what is a valuable life, and
living their lives in accordance with that decision,”86 and “the real and effective capacity to
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develop and pursue one’s own conception of a worthwhile life.”87 I propose to use a synthesis
of these options to formulate the minimalistic conception of personal autonomy I have in mind.
First, to be a fully autonomous agent, one must have the capacity or ability to develop
and pursue a conception of the good life in accordance with what one thinks is valuable. It is
important for full autonomy that an agent is able to both develop a conception of the good life
and actively pursue it. For instance, if an agent was able to develop a particular conception of
the good life, becoming a doctor say, but was prevented from going to medical school due to
coercive government policies, her autonomy would be undermined. It is also important for the
autonomous agent that her conception of the good life be influenced by reasons which are
truly her own and not unduly influenced by debilitating social conditions or by the wills of
others. No doubt this conception of personal autonomy is incomplete and unsatisfactory as a
theory of autonomy but it is enough to illustrate how pervasive discrimination against a
particular group of people can undermine these conditions of what being an autonomous agent
requires.
Once again, dignitary harms undermine autonomy by undermining the social bases of
self-respect. This notion of respect is similar to the conception of respect referred to by
Stephen Darwall as recognition respect.88 Recognition respect consists “in giving appropriate
consideration or recognition to some feature of its object in deliberating about what to do.”89
According to Darwall, recognition respect is owed to all persons simply in virtue of the fact that
they are persons. As such, persons “are entitled to have other persons take seriously and weigh
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appropriately the fact that they are persons in deliberating about what to do.”90 This extends to
one’s projects and ends. Since projects are constitutive of our identities, having respect for
persons entails that we consider their projects and ends seriously in our deliberations.
To have self-respect, then, is to recognize that one’s own projects and ends are
valuable, worth pursuing and should a play a role in our practical deliberations. Having respect
for oneself involves having a sense that one is a person whose projects and ends are valuable
and that one has dignity and moral worth simply in virtue of being a person.91 There are at least
two reasons why self-respect is important for autonomy. One is that self-respect and respectful
treatment from others makes it more likely that a person will be autonomous. This is because
autonomy and free agency “involves regarding oneself as having the normative authority to be
self-determining and self-governing” and a lack of self-respect undermines one’s ability to
perceive oneself as having that authority.92 It is also the case that “self-respect is needed to
inspire others to reciprocate with a similar attitude of respect toward oneself.”93 This is because
a lack of self-respect expresses to others that one does not take one’s ends seriously and is
effectively inconsistent regarding what one finds valuable. Since one does not take one’s own
ends seriously, and expresses this judgment to others, they too fail to take them seriously.
This brief description of self-respect helps to illustrate why discrimination, if pervasive
enough and based solely on contingent features of one’s identity, can be harmful and may
undermine one’s ability to be a fully autonomous agent. Unequal treatment on the grounds of
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one’s identity may give one the impression that one is not truly a person worthy of respect or
that one’s choices and value judgments do not have worth simply because of whom one is. In
order to instill self-respect in citizens, Joel Anderson and Axel Honneth have claimed that what
is required are “legally institutionalized relations of universal respect for the autonomy and
dignity of persons.”94 Two relevant questions at this juncture are whether we have such legally
institutionalized relations now and whether granting narrowly-tailored exemptions to wedding
vendors would undermine them.
At this point, I do not believe that we do have legally institutionalized relations of
universal respect for the autonomy and dignity of same-sex couples – at least not across the
board. This is because, as the federal law currently stands, businesses can refuse service solely
on the basis of the customer’s sexual orientation. I am happily willing to concede, however,
that the federal law is insufficient and that the federal public accommodation statute should
mirror those statutes which include sexual orientation as a protected class and which define
places of public accommodation in a suitably broad way. In those states and municipalities
where adequate public accommodation laws are in place, however, there are institutionalized
relations of respect for the autonomy and dignity of same-sex couples – at least in the realm of
public accommodations.
The question of whether granting narrowly-tailored exemptions to wedding vendors
would undermine those relations is asking whether providing such exemptions would
undermine the government’s obligation to respect the dignity and autonomy of all of its
citizens. After all, while respecting the dignity and autonomy of fellow citizens may be a moral
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obligation, it cannot be a legally enforceable one as that would involve literally coercing citizens
to have particular beliefs and to act on those beliefs. The best we can hope for is that the
government institutes regulations which respect the dignity and autonomy of all citizens as
thoroughly as possible. The government does this in the public accommodation context by
passing laws which make it illegal to refuse service to somebody based solely on the fact that
they have certain immutable identity characteristics (sex, race, sexual orientation, etc). This
respects their dignity and autonomy because it does not allow them to be excluded from the
public marketplace due to an immalleable aspect of their personal identity.
However, the government also needs to respect the autonomy and dignity of wedding
vendors with religious objections to same-sex marriage. Simply asserting that the fact that they
have such objections plays no role the social policy calculus at all displays a lack of respect for
an important part of their identity – their identity as a Christian and as an individual who wants
to operate their business in line with Christian principles. It also does not respect their
autonomy by compelling them to either participate in a religious ceremony they find offensive
or by undermining their ability to control the content of their expression.
The narrowly-tailored scheme of exemptions I propose is a compromise between
competing autonomy and equality interests. It still respects the equal dignity of same-sex
couples by only granting exemptions to those vendors who have additional reason to
discriminate other than the personal identity of the customer. However, while Koppelman is
correct that same-sex couples should not be protected from harms which result from others
expressing disagreement with their lifestyles, they can and should be protected from
discrimination which is only justified by the fact that they share certain identity characteristics.
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This scheme of exemptions also respects the autonomy of wedding vendors by granting
exemptions to those vendors whose autonomy is burdened the most.

§4. Objections and Concluding Remarks
I conclude in this section by considering a series of objections. The first is that, contrary
to what I have argued in prior sections, allowing narrowly tailored exemptions would lead to a
whole series of exemptions to anti-discrimination laws beyond those which regulate public
accommodations. I do recognize that this is a possibility depending on how the exemptions
were granted. It is possible that courts, in granting the types of exemptions I propose, could set
precedent that would lead to a type of slippery slope. But a convincing argument for this claim
would have to rely on the actual language that the courts use in granting exemptions and
whether certain rules of adjudication were developed. Given the fact that these exemptions
have not been granted, it is difficult to accept that this argument is sound. Furthermore, courts
are not the only avenue for exemptions to be granted. It is possible, and perhaps preferable, for
the exemptions I propose to be granted by the legislature. If specific language referring to
wedding vendors and public accommodations was utilized in drafting legislation granting
exemptions, it is difficult to see why any kind of broad slippery slope would arise as a
consequence.
One could still argue, however, that even within the public accommodation context, the
exemptions I propose would be broader than I admit or realize. I can only say to this point that
it might be true and, if true, would provide a reason for modifying my account. However, as I
suggested earlier, I believe that the vendors who fit into the two categories I put forward (to
reiterate, those categories are vendors whose conduct is inherently expressive and those who,
55

by providing goods or services for weddings, are active participants in the wedding
ceremonies), would be quite narrow. Unlike the religious liberty approach explored in the first
section, I do not believe that these exemptions would exclude same-sex couples from an entire
part of the public marketplace. All of the same types of venues – be they bakeries,
photographers or restaurants – would remain open to them. They can just not compel that
these businesses engage in any expressive artistry for their wedding ceremony or compel them
to participate in it. Such is the price of citizenship in a society which values religious liberty and
freedom of expression.
The other objections which I will address have been provided in a recent piece written
by Christie Hartley and Lori Watson. It will be worth quoting the summary of their position at
length so that I can respond to it point by point:
Here the vendor seeks an exemption from a law whose purpose is to enable and protect
a person’s standing as an equal citizen. That is, the antidiscrimination law in question
protects a person’s ability to participate in various spheres of social life as an equal
member of society and the ability of the person to pursue a view of the good like fellow
citizens. In other words, allowing public discrimination on the basis of factors such as
sexual orientation, sex, or race creates a kind of second-class citizenship for some
members of society. Such persons don’t enjoy the same access to goods, even if
identical goods are available elsewhere. And insofar as being denied the rights and
liberties that other persons as citizens enjoy in places of public accommodation affects
their standing in the public, political sphere, their ability to engage in public reasoning is
compromised. Someone might claim that the liberty of the vendor to refuse service to a
same-sex couple is a matter of equal standing, too; one might say it is important to
one’s standing as an equal citizen to enjoy the liberty to live in accordance with beliefs
and values fundamental to one’s identity. But this is precisely why understanding the
role of the criterion of reciprocity and political liberalism’s view of public reason is so
important.95
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It may be clear from some of my earlier statements and arguments where I disagree with
Hartley and Watson but it will be worth it to conclude on these points as I take them to be
fundamental disagreements that would likely occur between other political liberals and myself.
To begin, I will note a couple of areas of agreement which might be unsurprising. I agree
that the purpose of public accommodation laws is, at least in part, to enable and protect a
person’s standing as an equal citizen. I also agree that the undermining of this equal standing in
the public accommodation context may very well affect their standing in other public and
political spheres. Where I expect the locus of our disagreement lies is what we ought to mean
by equal standing and what the criterion of reciprocity entails.
First, there is some potential disagreement regarding what it means for a business to
discriminate “on the basis of” sexual orientation. As I argued earlier, it is at least plausible for
Jack Phillips, for example, to make the argument that he is not refusing service to same-sex
couples on the basis of their sexual orientation. He may argue that he is refusing service
because he does not want to express a message he finds disagreeable. As I also stated earlier,
courts have interpreted discrimination on the basis of specified characteristics to mean that,
but for the fact that the individuals had a particular characteristic, they would not have been
refused service. This seems true in the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop but, as I also pointed out,
there seem to be situations in which the customer’s identity may not have been implicated but
where he or she would have been denied service anyway (if they were not gay but were
purchasing the cake for a same-sex wedding, etc.).
Hartley and Watson also echo a point I made earlier when they suggested that someone
might argue that “one might say it is important to one’s standing as an equal citizen to enjoy
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the liberty to live in accordance with beliefs and values fundamental to one’s identity.”96 This
point is similar to my argument concerning the government’s role in respecting the autonomy
of all citizens. However, they then imply that this belief relies on a misunderstanding of the
criterion of reciprocity. I will first repeat my belief that there are actually equality interests on
both sides of the disputes – not just on the side of the same-sex couples who are refused
service. I will then conclude by discussing how I understand the criterion of reciprocity and why
a narrowly-tailored scheme of exemptions is consistent with it.
Watson and Hartley are right to point out that the equal standing of marginalized
citizens is important and is a fundamental purpose of anti-discrimination provisions. However,
guaranteeing the equal treatment of same-sex couples by privately owned businesses in the
public marketplace necessarily guarantees the unequal treatment of religious wedding vendors
by the government. It is not difficult to see why this is the case. Public accommodation laws
compel business owners like Jack Phillips to provide goods or services for same-sex weddings,
even when they believe that doing so is in violation of their religious obligations. Liberals like
Watson and Hartley rightly maintain that doing so is necessary in order to protect their equal
standing as a citizen. But this clearly entails involving the government in distributing an unequal
scheme of burdens and benefits. Those business owners who do not believe that same-sex
marriage is sinful do not have to choose between violating their conscience and violating the
law. Public accommodation laws do not burden them in the same way that they burden
business owners who do believe that same-sex marriage is sinful.
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Of course, that fact alone does not entail anything about the legitimacy or just nature of
the laws in question. Any substantial system of laws or regulations is going to burden some
citizens over others. For example, laws against murder burden those citizens whose conception
of the good life prioritizes murdering people. The fact that this is true should convince nobody
that laws against murder are not legitimate and just. But the framework which Vallier
developed is set up to exclude exactly those types of cases. That being said, I can see only three
reasons (independent of whether my arguments thus far have been sound) why we should
discount the equal standing of religious business owners or their liberty interests in the way
that Watson and Hartley seem to suggest we ought to: 1) The equal standing of same-sex
couples is at greater risk to be compromised in various political or social spheres than the equal
standing of religious business owners is. 2) Business owners who believe that they have a
religious obligation to refuse to provide goods or services to same-sex couples are
unreasonable or, at the very least, are acting unreasonably. 3) The scheme of exemptions I am
defending in this paper does not abide by the criterion of reciprocity as it is not one that all
reasonable people can accept. I will discuss each of these in turn.
The claim that the equal standing of same-sex couples is at greater risk compared to the
standing of religious business owners is likely true in many contexts. However, as I have already
shown, the approval for same-sex marriage is on a strong upward trend. Obviously, this trend
does not do anything about the fact that there remain huge holes in LGBTQ anti-discrimination
protections and the fact that being refused service on the basis of an essential part of one’s
identity can be a traumatic and harmful experience. However, there are certainly contexts in
which the equal standing of religious business owners is at greater risk and I would argue that

59

the public accommodation context is slowly becoming one of those. There have been several
business owners who have either lost their business, their professional reputation or thousands
of dollars – sometimes as the result of a disagreement about the moral status of particular
conduct (namely, same-sex weddings). I would argue that the equal standing of certain religious
business owners and their ability to run their business in line with their religious convictions is
at great risk in progressive states with robust anti-discrimination regulations. This is especially
true if we are to agree with the view that such is the ‘cost of citizenship’ and that religious
business owners should be expected to compromise their religious beliefs if they open up a
business to the public. Sometimes this is necessary, and it has been the project of this paper to
draw a practicable line between cases where it is and those where it is not, but to treat the
equality and liberty interests on one side as categorically inferior to the interests on the other
seems to me to be a significant threat to the equal standing of religious business owners.
The second claim is that the religious business owners I have been discussing are either
unreasonable or are acting unreasonably. When political liberals use the term ‘reasonable,’ it is
often referred to as a term of art. Going back to Rawls, political liberals claim that “persons are
reasonable in one basic aspect when, among equals say, they are ready to propose principles
and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance
that others will likewise do so.”97 Certainly there are many religious people who are
unreasonable or consistently act unreasonably (just as there are many non-religious people
who do the same). Religious citizens who would enforce their own moral views by overturning
the marriage equality decision are a perfect example of this unreasonableness in action. But if

97

Rawls, Political Liberalism, 49.

60

we go to the two broad groups of vendors who warrant exemptions under my view, it is not
clear why we should say that these are unreasonable people. There are many wedding vendors
who are probably fine with same-sex marriage being a legal institution. At the very least, many
of them have likely recognized that the Supreme Court has ruled in Obergefell that marriage
equality is constitutionally required and that same-sex marriages are here to stay. These
vendors are not taking to the streets demanding that the right for same-sex couples to marry
be revoked. What they want is to not be compelled by law to either participate in a same-sex
wedding ceremony or express a message of recognition for the legitimacy of same-sex
weddings. This does not seem unreasonable to me.
This point is closely related to the final objection I will consider which is that the scheme
of exemptions I defend does not fulfill the criterion of reciprocity. The criterion of reciprocity
dates back to Rawls and it outlines when exercise of political power is proper. Rawls wrote that
“our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we
offer for our political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as justification of
those actions.”98 Citizens fulfill this criterion of reciprocity by utilizing public reasons when
attempting to justify political power (constitutional amendments, legislation, government
regulation, etc.). Public reasons according to Rawls are reasons which do not rely on any
particular religious or philosophical worldview but can be accepted by citizens as free and equal
participants of civil society.
The suggestion that the scheme of exemptions I propose does not fulfill the criterion of
reciprocity rests on the claim that the reasons justifying it are not ones that all citizens can

98

Rawls, Political Liberalism, xliv.

61

reasonably accept. Furthermore, this claim goes back to one of the conditions which Vallier set
out in his framework: the intelligibility requirement. Since the intelligibility requirement allows
explicitly sectarian reasons to serve as justificatory reasons, it is open for liberals in the
Rawlsian vein to object that these are reasons that not everybody can reasonably accept. After
all, one of the justificatory reasons for Phillips relies explicitly on Biblical authority. Obviously,
citizens who do not see the Bible as a source of authority have no particular reason to accept
Phillips’ particular reasons as justificatory for them. Thus, the framework which Vallier
developed does not abide by the criterion of reciprocity as Rawls defines it.
While I do agree with Vallier on the correct interpretation of public reason liberalism, I
do also think that it is possible for the exemptions I defend to be justified by appealing to
properly public reasons (in the Rawlsian sense). After all, much of the analysis I have
undertaken in this paper has taken conventional constitutional jurisprudence as a starting
point. While I remain ambivalent regarding the exact status of the right to be exempt from
public accommodation laws and how it should be granted (whether it be basic or subsidiary; by
judicial review or via legislative action), I have utilized reasons drawn from work on religious
liberty and freedom of expression. Assuming that these are liberal values, and that they
themselves can be justified via public reasons, there does not seem to be any particular
obstacle to seeing my proposal as abiding by the Rawlsian criterion of reciprocity. The focal
point of the disagreement between other political liberals and me would then seem to be in the
details of the analysis, that is whether creating a customized wedding cake is really expressive
or whether being compelled to participate in a wedding ceremony would be a real and
substantial burden on one’s religious exercise. Obviously, I think that they are and have spent
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the bulk of the paper arguing for that claim. Whether my proposal really does abide by the
criterion of reciprocity, then, would seem to live or die by the soundness of my previous
arguments.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have provided a liberal argument for providing narrowly-tailored
exemptions to public accommodation laws. My approach to this contentious issue has been to
balance the equality and liberty interests on both sides of the dispute. That is, I believe that
both the same-sex couples and religious vendors have equality and liberty interests at stake
and it is my firm belief that a liberal approach should attempt to balance them. No doubt the
proposal I have defended seems unsatisfactory to parties on both sides. Proponents of broad
exemptions are likely to object that the categories of vendors which deserve exemptions under
my account are too narrow and that I am leaving out many other business owners who hold
religious objections to same-sex marriage but would be forced by law to facilitate same-sex
wedding ceremonies. On the other hand, opponents of exemptions are likely to object that I am
allowing religious reasons to serve as justifications for bigotry and invidious discrimination.
Needless to say, I do not believe that all people who have religious objections to same-sex
marriage are ‘bigots’ or that all discrimination is necessarily ‘invidious.’ But I also do not believe
that the government should exempt any and all business owners who have religious objections
to same-sex marriage as this would undermine the primary purpose of anti-discrimination laws.
What I have attempted to do, which I stated at the outset was my intent, is to provide a
compromise. Such a compromise may seem unappealing to many but such compromises are
necessary in societies defined by a plurality of opposing views and opinions.

63

Bibliography
Alvare, Helen. Symposium: As a matter of marriage law, wedding cake is expressive conduct. September
13, 2017. http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/09/symposium-matter-marriage-law-wedding-cakeexpressive-conduct/.
Anderson, Joel, and Axel Honneth. "Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice." In Autonomy
and the Challenges to Liberalism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Bailey, Sarah Pulliam. "Farm owners fined for saying no to lesbian wedding." The Washington Post,
August 19, 2014.
Benson, Paul. "Free Agency and Self-Worth." The Journal of Philosophy, 1994: 650-668.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 134 (Supreme Court of the United States, 2014).
Cantwell v. Connecticut. 310 (United States Supreme Court, 1940).
Colburn, Ben. Autonomy and Liberalism. New York : Routledge, 2010.
Corbin, Caroline Mala. "Speech or Conduct? The Free Speech Claims of Wedding Vendors." Emory Law
Journal, 2015: 241-302.
Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop. 370 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 2015).
Darwall, Stephen L. "Two Kinds of Respect." Ethics, 1977: 36-49.
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock. 309 (Supreme Court of New Mexico, 2013).
Garnett, Richard. Symposium: Conscience, conditions, and access to civil society. September 15, 2017.
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/09/symposium-conscience-conditions-access-civil-society/.
Gaus, Gerald F. "The Place of Autonomy within Liberalism." In Autonomy and the Challenges to
Liberalism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Gitlow v. New York. 268 (Supreme Court of the United States, 1925).
Govier, Trudy. "Self-Trust, Autonomy, and Self-Esteem." Hypatia, 1993: 99-120.
Hartley, Christie, and Lori Watson. "Political Liberalism and Religious Exemptions." In Religious
Exemptions, by Kevin Vallier and Michael Weber. New York : Oxford University Press, 2018.
Helfand, Michael A. "Identifying Substantial Burdens." University of Illinois Law Review, 2016: 17711808.
Hernandez v. Commissioner. 490 (United States Supreme Court, 1989).
Heyman, Steven J. "A Struggle for Recognition: The Controversy over Religious Liberty, Civil Rights, and
Same-Sex Marriage." First Amendment Law Review, 2015: 1-126.
Holik, Haley. "You Have the Right to Speak by Remaining Silent: Why a State Sanction to Create a
Wedding Cake is Compelled Speech." Regent University Law Review, 2015: 299-318.

64

Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston. 515 (United States Supreme Court,
1995).
Koppelman, Andrew. Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1996.
Koppelman, Andrew. "Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination
Law." Southern California Law Review, 2015: 619-660.
Laycock, Douglas, Anthony R. Picarello Jr., and Robin Fretwell Wilson. Same-Sex Marriage and Religious
Liberty: Emerging Conflicts. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2008.
Lomasky, Loren E. Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
Mackenzie, Catriona. "Three Dimensions of Autonomy: A Relational Analysis." In Autonomy, Oppression,
and Gender, by Andrea Veltman and Mark Piper. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Michigan Department of Civil Rights. "Michigan Department of Civil Rights Report on LGBT Inclusion
Under Michigan Law With Recommendations For Action." 2017.
Obergefell v. Hodges. 135 (Supreme Court of the United States, 2015).
Oshana, Marina A. L. "Autonomy and Self-Identity." In Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Oshana, Marina A. L. "Personal Autonomy and Society." Journal of Social Philosophy, 1998: 81-102.
Pew Research Center. Support for Same-Sex Marriage Grows, Even Among Groups That Had Been
Skeptical. June 26, 2017. http://www.people-press.org/2017/06/26/support-for-same-sex-marriagegrows-even-among-groups-that-had-been-skeptical/.
Quong, Jonathan. Public Reason. 2013. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/publicreason/.
Rawls, John. Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.
Raz, Joseph. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina. 487 (United States Supreme Court, 1988).
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees. 468 (United States Supreme Court, 1984).
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights. 547 (United States Supreme Court, 2006).
Saidel-Goley, Issac. "The Right Side of History: Prohibiting Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Public
Accommodations, Housing, and Employment." Wisconsin Journal of Law, Gender & Society, 2016: 117156.
Scanlon, Thomas. "A Theory of Freedom of Expression." Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1972: 204-226.
Sisk, Gregory C., and Michael Heise. "Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11: Empirical
Evidence from the Federal Courts." Iowa Law Review, 2012: 231-292.
65

Spence v. Washington. 418 (United States Supreme Court, 1974).
Stack, Liam. "The Challenges That Remain for L.G.B.T. People After Marriage Ruling." The New York
Times, June 30, 2016.
Texas v. Johnson. 491 (United States Supreme Court, 1989).
Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division. 450 (United States Supreme
Court, 1981).
Uhland, Audrey. "The Business of Expression: A Commercial, Constitutional, and Historical Evaluation of
the Line Between the First Amendment and Antidiscrimination Laws." Southern California
Interdisciplinary Law Journal, 2017: 405-426.
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. "Frequently Asked Questions About the Defense of
Marriage." US. CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS.
United States v. O'Brien. 391 (United States Supreme Court, 1968).
Vallier, Kevin. Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation. New York: Routledge, 2014.
Vallier, Kevin. "The Moral Basis of Religious Exemptions." Law and Philosophy, 2016: 1-28.
Vallier, Kevin, and Fred D'Agostino. Public Justification. 2014.
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/justification-public/.

66

